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The European Union: Time to Further 
Peace and Justice 
Laura Davis 
The EU has become increasingly engaged 
in peace processes, which is welcome. This 
engagement  has  often  been  through  the 
European  Union  Special  Representatives 
(EUSRs),  and  had  tended  to  be  ad  hoc. 
This brief argues that the External Action 
Service  (EAS)  should  address  the  role  the 
EU  could  and  should  play  in  peace 
processes early. It is not a role that should 
develop organically anymore; it is time for 
strategic  decision-making.  Ten  years  on, 
the  review  of  the  Gothenburg  programme 
on  conflict  prevention  has  been  shelved, 
and  the  direction  of  the  so-called 
‘horizontal’ issues – like peace mediation – 
in  the  EAS  are  still  under  consideration. 
This presents an ideal opportunity to assess 
what EU diplomats should be contributing 
to  peace  processes,  and  making  the 
necessary  support  available.  After  all, 
interventions of this kind affect not only the 
EU’s  external  action  and  its  intended 
beneficiaries, but also the Union’s identity 
on the world stage. 
As the EU emerges as a global player, it should 
engage more effectively in mediating an end to 
violent conflicts, especially given the extent of 
EU aid for post-conflict reconstruction. 
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This need not equate with a global role as a 
peace broker;  there may be many reasons why 
the  EU  cannot  or  should  not  engage  in 
particular places, but where it does intervene it 
should  be  more  effective  and  build  on 
experience from places such as Georgia or the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
 
The  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  called 
for  ‘stronger  diplomatic  capability’
1  including 
in the context of conflict prevention and crisis 
management;  the  2008  ESS  Implementation 
report  noted  that  ‘We  should  …expand  our 
dialogue and mediation capacities’
2 which led 
to  the  Concept  on  Strengthening  EU 
Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, adopted in 
2009.
3 ‘Mediation’ is used in this brief to mean 
an  intervention  in  an  international  crisis  or 
intrastate  crisis  with  potential  international 
repercussions designed to help the parties find 
a negotiated solution rather use force. The role 
the EU plays in mediation goes to the heart of 
EU  foreign  policy,  yet  it  has  no  policy 
guidance on it.   
 
The EU and Mediation tracks  
This paper focuses on official negotiations at 
diplomatic levels, or Track I mediation. Over 
time  there  may  be  a  range  of  engagements 
with  different  actors– t h e  ‘multi-track’ 
approach.  Track  II  refers  to  individuals  or 
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organisations  who  have  privileged  access  to 
Track I actors, but are not themselves party to 
the negotiations. Track III is the grassroots, or 
community level talks and dialogues which may 
have no direct connection with Track I but may 
influence  negotiations  indirectly.    Track  III-
type  dialogue  projects  can  be  very  important 
for the long-term success of peace agreements 
brokered at the Track I level. The tracks may 
not necessarily operate in parallel; there may be 
considerable  fluidity  between  them.  Progress 
may  vary  between  different  tracks.  Track  I 
actors may also be supporting other efforts at 
Track II or III, or Track II or III initiatives may 
be creating an enabling environment for Track 
I processes.   
 
The EU may be involved in all aspects of multi-
track diplomacy: EU representatives (the High 
Representative, an EUSR or ambassador, or a 
member state acting on the EU’s behalf) may 
be engaged in Track I processes. The EU may 
convene  (directly  or  indirectly)  Track  II 
initiatives, and it may support talks at Track I 
or  II,  without  participating  directly.  CSDP 
missions may have a direct role in Track I or 
Track  II  processes,  and  may  also  be  key  for 
monitoring  and/or  implementing  agreements. 
The  EU  regularly  funds  Track  I,  II  and  III 
initiatives through the European Development 
Fund  (EDF),  European  Instrument  for 
Democracy  and  Human  Rights  (EIDHR)  or 
the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The EU has 
the necessary instruments for engaging in each 
of these tracks; the question is whether it is able 
to engage them systematically and strategically 
across the tracks.
4  
 
Mediation  
Mediation approaches may be  power-based or 
interest-based,  or  somewhere  in  between.  In 
the first, mediators use power or leverage ( the 
promise  of  rewards  and  the  threat  of 
punishment)    to  broker  a  deal  which  reflects 
the balance of power rather than the roots of 
conflict.  Interest-based  or  problem-solving 
mediators  use  a  more  facilitative  style, 
promoting the ownership of the parties over 
the  process  and  supporting  outcomes  which 
meet the interests of all parties and addresses 
the root causes of the conflict.   
 
 ‘Mediation’  includes  a  broad  range  of 
processes,  the  results  of  which  can  be  quite 
different.  Power-based  negotiations  may  lead 
to a cease-fire which (temporarily at least) halts 
the  violence  but  may  not  address  the 
underlying  causes  of  the  conflict:  a  conflict 
management approach, particularly relevant to 
CDSP. Interest-based facilitation seeks longer-
term  and  more  sustainable  resolution  – t h e  
conflict prevention or peace-building approach 
usually  associated  with  the  EC.  Different 
approaches  can  be  applied  together;  the  EU 
has  the  range  of  instruments  to  (potentially) 
engage in different forms of mediation and in 
different tracks.   
 
The challenge of ‘normative mediation’: 
combining peace and justice  
Geopolitical concerns are not the only factors 
determining  how  the  EU  might  engage  in 
peace mediation. Peace agreements are usually 
reached in the aftermath of protracted violent 
conflict  in  which  all  sides  have  committed 
grave  human  rights  violations  and  other 
crimes, and violence may be ongoing.  Keeping 
the  options  open  for  pursuing  accountability 
for  serious  human  rights  violations  can  be  a 
major challenge for victims and human rights 
activists.  Mediators are increasingly expected 
to  ensure  that  peace  agreements  respect 
international standards on human rights. UN 
mediators,  for  example,  are  prohibited  from 
witnessing  deals  allowing  amnesty  for 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
or serious human rights violations.  
 
The  EU  has  strong  commitments  to 
international justice and human rights, as well 
as  to  peace:  it  is  a  strong  supporter  of  the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and other   3 
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international tribunals. It has large programmes 
addressing the rule of law (EDF), human rights 
promotion  (EIDHR)  and  security  system 
reform through EDF and CSDP. The EU also 
supports  the  group  of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions (UNSCRs) on women, peace and 
security  including  UNSCR  1325  (2000), 
UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009) and 
1889 (2009). These resolutions reiterate states’ 
obligations to prosecute perpetrators of sexual 
violence, prohibit amnesty for these crimes and 
call for vetting of armed forces to remove and 
prosecute  perpetrators.  EU  human  rights 
guidelines  are  piecemeal  when  it  comes  to 
peacemaking, however.
5 
 
The mediation concept notes that:  
‘EU mediation efforts must be fully in line 
with  and  supportive  of  the  principles  of 
international human rights and humanitarian 
law, and must contribute to fighting impunity 
for human rights violations’.
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EU mediators are expected to address human 
rights  violations  in  peace  processes  and  to 
assess support to transitional justice initiatives, 
but  the  concept  gives  no  indication  for  how 
they  may  do  so.  While  UN  mediators  have 
detailed  guidelines  to  follow  relating  to 
accountability  for  human  rights  violations  in 
peacemaking,  EU  mediators  have  no  policy 
guidance  on  mediation  in  general  or 
accountability in peacemaking. 
 
The EU Special Representatives  
The EU Special Representatives are frequently 
described as mediators, but to date there has 
not  been  any  comprehensive  study  of 
mediation as practiced by EUSRs. ‘Mediation’ 
only appeared in one EUSR mandate in 2010:  
the EUSR to the African Union should support 
the AU in developing its mediation capacity.
7  
 
The  mandates  for  the  EUSRs  to  the  South 
Caucasus, the crisis in Georgia, Moldova, the 
Great Lakes and Central Asia all use different 
language  to  describe  mediation-related 
activities:  confidence-building  measures 
between  parties  (South  Caucasus);  preparing 
international  talks  (crisis  in  Georgia); 
contributing  to  the  negotiation  and 
implementation  of  peace  and  cease-fire 
agreements  (Great  Lakes);  and  building 
relationships  with  stakeholders  to  prevent 
conflict  (Central  Asia).  The  EUSRs  for 
Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Middle East peace 
process are mandated to support, rather than 
engage in, processes, while the EUSRs in the 
Western Balkans are mandated to support the 
implementation of peace agreements.  
 
Turning to international justice, EUSRs cover 
three  situations  under  investigation  by  the 
ICC– Sudan, Uganda and the DRC (the EUSR 
for the Great Lakes covers both Uganda and 
DRC).  But  only  the  EUSR  for  Sudan  is 
mandated to support the ICC’s work.  Georgia 
is  one  of  the  cases  under  preliminary 
investigation  by  the  ICC,  but  neither  EUSR 
working on Georgia  is mandated to support 
the Court’s work there.  
 
The ICC is not the only mechanism through 
which justice can be pursued for serious human 
rights  violations.    Transitional  justice 
approaches  include  criminal  prosecutions 
through  international,  national  or  hybrid 
tribunals; truth-seeking (through, for example, 
truth  commissions);  reparations  for  victims; 
and reform of public institutions. Planning for 
these  approaches  may  be  particularly 
appropriate  in  peace  processes,  and  the 
mediation concept recognises this. Yet despite 
its  extensive  support  for  transitional  justice 
processes worldwide, the EU is yet to develop 
an  EU  approach  to  supporting  transitional 
justice.  
 
EU mediation in Georgia and Congo  
Two very different contexts, Georgia and the 
DRC, illustrate how EUSRs have contributed 
to  mediation.  Georgia  provides  a  particularly   4 
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complex  example  of  different  EU  actors  at 
work:  President  Sarkozy  of  France  led  EU 
efforts on behalf of the French presidency of the 
EU  in  brokering  a  ceasefire  in  the  Georgia-
Russia conflict in 2008. An EUSR for the South 
Caucasus has been in place since 2003 and was 
mandated  to  support  confidence-building 
initiatives  between  Armenia,  Azerbaijan  and 
Georgia,  including  through  EUSR’s  Border 
Support Team. In 2008, Pierre Morel, EUSR for 
Central  Asia,  took  on  the  additional  post  of 
EUSR to the crisis in Georgia.  
 
Overlaps  between  the  two  and  perceptions  of 
their  differing  roles  have  caused  considerable 
confusion. A CSDP civilian monitoring mission 
(EUMM)  is  also  deployed  in  Georgia,  and 
facilitates  talks  between  representatives  of  the 
parties  on  security  issues.    EUSR  Morel  co-
chairs the Geneva talks, with the OSCE and the 
UN,  in  which  representatives  of  EUMM 
participate  but  EUSR  Semneby  does  not. 
Mediating a resolution to the conflict presents 
many challenges beyond the EU’s control, but 
the EU’s effectiveness is undermined by a lack 
of clarity and coordination between the different 
EU  institutions  engaged  in  the  mediation 
process.
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In  Congo,  EUSR  van  de  Geer  co-facilitated, 
with the USA and UN, negotiations between the 
government and armed groups which led to the 
Goma  ceasefire  agreement  of  2008.  The 
facilitators  insisted  that  war  crimes,  crimes 
against humanity and genocide be excluded from 
the amnesty in the agreement. The mandates of 
the two CSDP missions (EUSEC and EUPOL) 
were then extended to support implementing the 
agreements
9  and  the  EC  and  member  states 
provided  additional  funding  and  technical 
assistance. The EUSR could not commit the EC 
or  member  states  to  anything,  but  he  was 
perceived  as  being  able  to  influence  these 
decisions.  The  EUSR’s  regional  mandate  was 
also important in this mediation role.
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Conclusion 
It is in the EU’s interest to develop a greater 
capacity to mediate violent conflicts. The EU 
has  engaged  in  mediation  for  some  time, 
particularly at Tracks II and III. The variety of 
EU actors and tools with which to engage in 
mediation  could  be  a  strength  for  the  EU, 
enabling flexible responses at Tracks I, II and 
III.  But  without  a  policy  or  support  from 
headquarters this potential is not realised, and 
flexibility is replaced by inconsistency.  At best 
different EU actors fail to complement each 
other,  at  worst  they  undermine  each  other’s 
interventions.  
 
The  creation  of  the  EAS  offers  an  ideal 
opportunity to place peacemaking firmly at the 
heart of EU foreign policy. Going forward, the 
EAS  could  start  with  reflecting  on  the  EU’s 
experience  to  date.  EUSRs  have  engaged  in 
some  processes  at  Track  I,  and  as  single-
country  EUSRs  are  replaced  by  EU 
ambassadors,  lessons  should  be  drawn  from 
these  experiences.  Not  all  conflicts  are 
confined to one state, however. To date, one 
clear  advantage  of  the  EUSR  function  has 
been  cross-border  mandates  in  conflict-
affected regions, which has added considerable 
value to EU engagement.  
 
EU diplomats have insufficient policy guidance 
and technical support in peacemaking. There is 
no  technical  support  in  mediation  processes, 
or  on  thematic  substance  issues  like 
accountability for human rights violations and 
the parameters of international law. The result 
may be inconsistent approaches, allowing too 
much flexibility for individuals and insufficient 
clarity of the EU’s foreign policy.  
 
The EAS should create capacity to support its 
diplomats  engaged  in  peace  processes  in 
headquarters.  But this is a long-term process; 
it takes time to build up this capacity and the 
first  step  should  be  assessing  what  the  EAS 
actually needs. Undoubtedly the EU needs to   5   
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develop its own approach and its own internal 
support, but it should also consider the models 
used  by  other  states  and  the  UN,  such  as 
mediation support teams, rosters and so forth. 
There may be some skills – such as mediation 
process  design  –  that  are  better  contracted  in 
from  external  specialists  than  developed  in-
house.  
 
Independent organisations may provide a way of 
supporting  internal  EU  capacity-building  while 
also  engaging  expertise  from  outside.  An  EU 
Institute for Peace could fulfil other important 
functions too, such as preparing the ground for 
official  talks,  hosting  Track  II  meetings  and 
providing thematic and process expertise. This 
would complement existing security and foreign 
policy think tanks and practitioner networks and 
provide a platform for delivering timely expert 
support to peace processes.  
 
Finally, EU mediators need to address multiple 
competing needs and principles. The EU needs 
to address how it pursues its commitments to 
both peace and justice. Although the mediation 
concept  states  that  mediators  must  respect 
international standards and consider transitional 
justice options in peace processes, there is not 
yet  any  guidance  for  how  EU  officials  may  do 
this.  
 
Maximising the chances for peace and justice in 
negotiations is rarely an easy task, and one for 
which  mediators  need  policy  guidance  and 
technical support. UN mediators have guidelines 
to  follow  in  peacemaking,  there  may  be 
interesting learning from this that the EU could 
benefit  from.    The  EU  also  has  considerable 
experience of its own in these questions – both 
within its borders and abroad – which it should 
combine with learning from the UN and others 
to develop an EU approach to peace and justice. 
 
Laura  Davis  is  a  consultant  working  on 
justice and peace-building issues, and a PhD 
candidate at the University of Ghent. 
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